Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Frank Moyle Creer and John Preston Creer v. Valley
Bank and Trust Company : Brief of Appellee
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary Doctorman; John T. Anderson; Biele, Haslam and Hatch; Attorneys for Defendants/
Appellants.
John Preston Creer; Pro Se; Keith Bradford Romney; Attorney for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Creer and Creer v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, No. 880179.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2119

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME COURT
flB!EF
UTAH
DOCUMEN*
KFU

45.9
59
OOCKEfNU

IN THE SUPffiME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK MOYLE CREER and JOHN
PRESTON CREER
Plaintiffs/Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JOHN PRESTON CREER
AND FRANK MOYLE CREER

vs.
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, VALLEY
CENTRAL BANK, a Utah Corporation, MARCUS TAYLOR, receiver,

Docket No. 88-0179

Priority No. 14B
Defendants/Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GARY DOCTORMAN (0895) and
JOHN T. ANDERSON (0094)
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for
De fendants/Appel1ants
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666

JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753)
Pro Se
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300
KEITH BRADFORD ROMNEY (3948)
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respondent Frank Moyle Creer
50 South Main Street, Suite 530
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141
Telephone: (801) 521-3496

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FRANK MOYLE CREER and JOHN
PRESTON CREER
Plaintiffs/Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
JOHN PRESTON CREER
AND FRANK MOYLE CREER

vs.
VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, VALLEY
CENTRAL BANK, a Utah Corporation, MARCUS TAYLOR, receiver,

Docket No. 88-0179
Priority No. 14B

Defendants/Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY
THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

GARY DOCTORMAN (0895) and
JOHN T. ANDERSON (0094)
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorneys for
De fendants/Appel1ants
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666

JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753)
Pro Se
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300
KEITH BRADFORD ROMNEY (3948)
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Respondent Frank Moyle Creer
50 South Main Street, Suite 530
Salt Lake City, Utah 84141
Telephone: (801) 521-3496

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

1.
2.

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings

2
2

3.

Statement of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

4

ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT NO. 1
THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT IS THE EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY FOR OBTAINING AND PERFECTING A SECURITY
INTEREST IN THE STATE OF UTAH ON A REGISTERED
MOTOR VEHICLE
SUMMARY

i

5
9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Draper Bank & Trust Company v. Ed Lawson,
675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983)

5, 10

Manufacturers Credit Corporation v. Peoples
Trust of New Jersey,
441 F.2d 1313 (CA Third Circuit)

6

IN RE Vinarskv
287 F.Supp. 446 (New York)

6

Statutes
§78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated

1

§41-1-81, §41-1-86, Utah Code Annotated

6

§41-1-83, Utah Code Annotated

7

§41-1-85, Utah Code Annotated

7

§41-1-87, Utah Code Annotated

7

§70A-9-302(3), Utah Uniform Commercial Code

8

Rules
Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

1

Constitution
Article 8, §3, Utah Constitution

1

Treatises
Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, 9-302:19

11

7

JURISDICTION
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Article
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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an

appeal from a final judgment dated April 6,

1988, and entered April
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* i-i.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL

The Di stri ct Court
Vehicle Act
motor

is

vehicle

the

properly ruled that the

exclusive means for

in the State

of

Utah and

recording a
that

Utah Motor
lien on a

ai I I mperfected

security

interest fi 1 ed under the Utah uniform Commercial Code is

without

effect

vehicle.

as

t< i

a

clear

titl*

<n a

licensed motorized

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case,

action against defendants for
claim

to a

a

Plaintiffs

instituted

plaintiffs7

determination that

1978 International cement mixer, ten

this

yard,

Cummins

defendants7 interests in

230 (the "cement mixer"), prevails over
the cement mixer.
2.

Course of Proceedings.

plaintiffs filed a Verified

On

October

27, 1987,

Complaint for Declaratory

Relief in

the Sixth Judicial District Court in and for Sevier County, State
of Utah,

civil number

10140,

requesting

a

determination that

plaintiffs own and that defendants have no interest in the cement
mixer.

(R.l)

Valley

Bank and Trust company and Valley Central

Bank (collectively referred to
Counterclaim.
Plaintiffs

The

replied

as "Valley") filed

Counterclaim
to

Valley's

an Answer and

sought

attorney's

Counterclaim

(R.54)

fees.
and

the

parties began discovery proceedings.
On
Judgment

March 3, 1988, Valley

which

was

Judgment filed by

followed

plaintiffs

After hearing both parties7
Honorable Don

V.

Valley7s motion.

by
on

a

Cross-Motion

March

Motions

for

On April

for

Summary
Summary

9, 1988.

(R.163, 177)

Summary

Judgment, the

plaintiffs7

Tibbs granted
(R.197)

filed a Motion for

motion

6, 1988, the

and denied

court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, concluding that F. Creer

2

has

title

to, and Valley has no interest in, the cement mixer•

(R.203; Addendum No.
the court on April

1) Judgment against

6, 1988 (R.208) and on May 1, 1988, Valley

filed a Notice of Appeal
Both

parties

Valley was entered by

to the Utah

subsequently

case, which motions

were

Supreme Court.

(R.212)

moved for summary disposition of the
denied by the court and the appeal was

reserved for plenary review.
3.
Products,

Inc. ("Lays"),

promissory
(R.204)
Valley

Statement of Facts.

note

On April 22, 1982,

executed

("Note")

and delivered

Lays Rock

to Valley a

in the principal sum of $250,000.

As security for the Note, Lays executed and delivered to
a security agreement

granting Valley a security interest

in certain personal property,

including the cement

is the subject

of this action.

had

of the cement

possession

agreement

was executed.

(R.204)

Lays was the owner and

mixer at the time the security

(R.8) Valley

security interest. (R.167,204)

never

Plaintiff,

John

approximately
Preston

services for L. A. Young.

perfected

their

Lays was later merged into L.A.

Young Sons Construction Company ("L.A. Young").
Between

mixer, which

June,

Creer

(R. 167,204).

1986, and March, 1987,

("J.P. Creer") performed legal

(R.204)

L. A. Young, however, failed

to compensate J. P. Creer, for his legal services

and in March,

1987, J.P. Creer informed L. A. Young that he would

not continue

legal representation unless L. A. Young paid J. P. Creer's legal

3

bill.
Alan

(R.205)
G.

Young,

certificate
later

As a result, L. A. Young,
executed

and

of title to the

transferred

title

delivered

cement

to

through its president,

the

to

P.

mixer. (R.205)

cement

mixer

plaintiff, Frank Creer ("F. Creer"). (R.205)
notice of

J.

Creer

a

J.P. Creer

to

his

son,

J. P. Creer had no

the filing by Valley Bank prior to receiving the title

to the motor vehicle.

(R.205)

At the time he received title to the cement mixer, J.P.
Creer

intended

partial

and understood

satisfaction

of

that it was being transferred in

L.A.

Young's debt to

previously rendered legal services and
as security

person.

that it was not

for that debt. (R.205) F. Creer obtained

of the cement mixer but
being told

J.P. Creer

by Alan

intended

possession

thereafter relinquished possession after

Young that there might be violence upon

(R. 181-182,

for

190-191)

his

The cement mixer remained in the

possession of L. A. Young until Marcus

Taylor, as receiver, took

possession of it.

(R.181,191)

asserts a security

interest in the cement mixer, but rather base

their

claim

to

the

evidenced by a clear
Motor Vehicles.

cement

Neither J.P.

mixer

on

an

Creer nor F. Creer

ownership

interest

certificate of title from the Department of

(R.205)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The recording provisions of the Utah
are

the

sole and exclusive

means

4

by which

Motor Vehicle Act
one can encumber a

title to a licensed motor vehicle in the State of Utah.

ARGUMENT NO. 1
THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR
OBTAINING AND PERFECTING A SECURITY INTEREST IN THE
STATE OF UTAH ON A REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLE
Plaintiff/Respondent
Company v. Ed Lawson, 675

P.2d

relies
1174

upon

(Utah 1983).

pointed out that this case has nothing to
in a dealers7 inventory.

Draper Bank & Trust
It should be

do with motor vehicles

In the Draper Bank & Trust case:

The general rule governing liens on motor vehicles not
in a dealer's inventory is that perfection of a lien is
governed exclusively by the filing and title provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Act, U.C.A., 1953, §§41-1-81 and
41-1-86.
Under these provisions the perfection of a lien on an
automobile depends upon the appearance of the lien
interest on the vehicle's certificate of title. The
filing of a financing statement pursuant to Article 9
is not effective to protect a lien interest in an
automobile sold to a consumer. §41-1-80(2) and §70A-9302(3)(b)...
Thus,
these
provisions treat
the
perfection of a security interest for the financing of
automobiles held in a dealer's inventory for resale
differently from a security interest in an automobile
for some other reason.
Other jurisdictions
have
uniformly interpreted §9-302(3)(b) in the same way, as
has one well-known U.C.C. commentator. (Pg. 1177)
The

court then goes on,

other states who have sustained the

in

a footnote, to cite

motor vehicle

title laws as

the exclusive means of perfecting title in a motor vehicle.

5

many

In Manufacturers Credit Corporation v. Peoples Trust of
New Jersey,

441

F.2d 1313 (CA Third Circuit)

held specifically

that:
We have held that where the Certificate of Ownership
Law of New Jersey is applicable to the filing of a
security interest in a motor vehicle, its provisions,
and not those of the New Jersey Uniform Commercial
Code, govern the proper method of filing. (Citations
omitted)

This

same

provision

was

held

IN RE Vinarsky,

287

F.Supp. 446, wherein a New York court ruled:

A security instrument filed through the provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code were null and void because
they failed to file a lien with the Motor Vehicle Code.

Practically
transference

of

speaking,

titles

of

there

motor

would

vehicles if

be
an

chaos

in

unperfected

security interest was not recorded of record under the Utah Motor
Vehicle
Bank's
of

Act in the Utah Motor Vehicle

Department.

theory, everyone would have to check

Business

Regulation

to see

security interest filed against

if

someone

Under Valley

with the Department
had an unperfected

their automobile as they went to

seek title from the Utah Motor Vehicle Department.
Motor vehicles are governed
and title

exclusively

by the filing

provisions of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act, U.C.A. 1953,

as amended, Sections 41-1-81, 41-1-86.

6

Section

41-1-83

of

U.C.A.

1953, states

as follows:

(1) Upon receipt of a title application the department
shall file it, and when satisfied as to the
authenticity of the application, shall issue a new
certificate of title in usual form, giving the
name of the owner and a statement of all liens and
encumbrances
certified to
the department as
existing under the vehicle.
If a

lien or

encumbrance

was

Department, as it was not in this case,
Vehicles would have no
encumbrance and would

way

not

certified

the Department

of knowing if there

therefore clear the

was

to the
of Motor

a lien

or

title and issue a new

certificate.
Further,

Section

41-1-85, U.C.A.

(1953

as amended)

states as follows:
The filing and issuance of a new certificate of title
under 41-1-82 and 41-1-83
constitute constructive
notice of all liens and encumbrances against the
vehicle to creditors of the owner, or subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers.
Note constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances.
A

lien

or

encumbrance

recorded

elsewhere

would

not

be

constructive notice to a creditor or subsequent purchaser.
Further 41-1-87, U.C.A. (1953 as amended) states:
This method provided in Section 41-1-82 through 41-1-86
of giving constructive notice of a lien or encumbrance
upon a registered vehicle is exclusive.
Exclusive is exclusive.
Andersons

Uniform

Commercial

Motor Vehicles, states as follows:

7

Code,

9-302:19

under

In many states, local variations of the Code expressly
declare that the perfection of a security interest in a
motor vehicle shall be governed by a motor vehicle title
registration statute, with the consequence that the
Code is not applicable thereto. The Uniform Commercial
Code gives each state the option of providing a nonCode system of perfection for security interests in
motor vehicles by providing for central filing and
certificate
notation.
The
translation
of
the
perfecting of security interests in motor vehicles to a
title certificate statute effects not only a change in
the place of filing but also a change as to what is
filed: under the Code, the filing is of a financing
statement, or a security agreement in lieu of a
financing
statement,
whereas
under
the
title
certificate statute the paper which is filed is an
application for a title certificate to the collateral
vehicle in which application it is recited that the
vehicle is subject to a lien or security interest in
favor of the secured party.
When the perfection of a security interest in a motor
vehicle is governed by non-Code law, the creditor must
comply with that law or his interest is not perfected,
even though the creditor files a financing statement
which would be sufficient under the Code if other
collateral were involved.
Code §9-302(2) declares
unambiguously that a security interest in property
covered by a statute which provides for central filing
of, or which requires indication of a security interest
on a certificate of title, may be perfected only by
registration or
filing under such statute or by
indication of the security interest on a certificate of
title or a duplicate thereof issued under such statute.
The
the
the
the

rationale for the exemption of motor vehicles from
general pattern of Article 9 is the recognition of
wide-spread existence of local statutes governing
subject.

Further,

the

Utah

Uniform

302(3) states as follows:

8

Commercial Code

, 70A-9-

The filing of a financing statement otherwise required
by this chapter is not necessary or effective to
perfect a security interest in property subject to and
(b) those statutes of this state which provide
for the indication of security interest on certificate.
We

have

already reviewed

State (the Motor Vehicle

the

other statutes

Act) which provide

of security interest on the certificate".

of the

for "the indication

This section says that

the filing of a financing statement is not effective to perfect a
security interest.
There

is no

provision, under

Act, for unperfected security interests.

the Utah Motor

Vehicle

The lien or encumbrance

is either recorded on the certificate of title or it

is not.

it

clear motor

is

not it has no

legal

affect on

obtaining a

If

vehicle title.
There is no issue in this case as to competing interest
of record

on the motor

over the other.

vehicle title

Valley

Bank did

as

to which has priority

not record anything of record

with the Department of Motor Vehicles.

SUMMARY
The various requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code
are

not

part

Respondents had
possession

of
no

of the

the

Utah

notice
truck

Motor

of

but

the

Vehicle
U.C.C.

Act.
filing.

relinquished it

9

Plaintiffs/
They

under threat

had
of

violence.

They received

the

truck in payment of

a debt.

The

title actually issued listed no liens or encumbrances.
The plaintiffs/respondents urge the
the Draper Bank (supra) case,
the exclusive means
vehicles in
those of

Utah

method of filing.

to reaffirm

that the Utah Motor Vehicle Act is

for recording liens or encumbrances on motor

the State

the

court

of Utah

and that

Uniform Commercial
Lastly, that

its provisions and not

Code govern

the

proper

an unperfected security interest

filed under the Uniform Commercial Code does not in any way cloud
or

supersede the

title if it is not properly recorded under the

Utah Motor Vehicles Act.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of September, 1988.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the above BRIEF OF
RESPONDENTS JOHN PRESTON CREER AND FRANK MOYLE CREER were handdelivered on the 9'^L'day of September, 1988, to:
Gary E. Doctorman, Esq.
John T. Anderson, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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